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Abstract
In this study, we investigated the relationships between board structure and financial 
performance, limited to nonfinancial firms listed on the Vietnam Stock Exchange. First, we 
found that a dual leadership structure, where the CEO and Chairman positions are held by the 
same person, was positively associated with firm-level financial performance. Second, we found 
evidence inconsistent with previous empirical findings that board size is positively associated 
with significantly higher financial performance. In particular, we found that the proportion of 
outside directors was negatively correlated with financial performance after controlling for 
endogeneity. These results proved to be robust with other model specifications and estimation 
methods. If poor-performing firms nominate additional outside directors under pressure from 
dissatisfied shareholders, these results could be explained. Additionally, we found strong 
evidence indicating a positive linear relationship exists between ownership by the Chairman (a 
proxy for board ownership) and firm performance. 
Keywords: board structure, corporate financial performance, corporate governance, Vietnam.
JEL classification: G32, G34, G39.
1. Introduction
The effects of board structure on firm-level performance are important to consider 
from a perspective of corporate governance. Berle and Means (1932) argue that conflicts of 
interest exist between managers (in this case, board members) and shareholders. Managers 
may pursue personal objectives which are not in alignment with the firm-value-maximization 
interests of shareholders. Morck et al. (1988), and McConnell and Servaes (1990) describe 
a non-monotonic relationship between managerial ownership and firm market valuation, 
showing that the two are positively related. However, the managers may become entrenched 
(they may pursue self benefits) when their ownership reaches a certain high level. Managerial 
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ownership then becomes an important governance mechanism, and it affects the classical 
manager-owner agency problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Various governance initiatives, 
such as increasing the proportion of outside directors, are implemented to monitor the 
managers and mitigate the agency problem. However, the effectiveness of the board structure 
varies across different economic and regulatory environments (Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998). 
How various aspects of board structure affects firm-level performance in different contexts is 
still a question in need of empirical research.
The purposes of this study were to examine the relationship between firm financial 
performance and three specific features of board structure. In it, we studied nonfinancial firms 
publicly traded on the Vietnamese stock exchanges from 2006-2010. Previous studies on this 
topic generally used data from the US or other Western countries (Erickson, Park, Reising, 
& Shin, 2005; Short & Keasey, 1999; Vafeas & Theodorou, 1998, among others). Because 
we focused on an economy that is still emerging and in transition, such as that in Vietnam, 
we may provide additional stylized facts about the effects of board structure on firm-level 
performance in the specific research environment, and make valuable contributions to the 
current body of corporate governance literature. In this study, we used dual leadership, board 
size, and percentage of outside board members as the board structure features of interest. Three 
indicators were used to measure corporate financial performance: Return on Assets (ROA), 
Return on Equity (ROE), and Tobin’s Q. We then empirically examined the relationship 
between each feature of the board structure and financial performance, as measured by these 
three ratios.
First, we found a significant positive relationship between dual leadership and financial 
performance in both univariate and multivariate tests. This result is consistent with those 
of Brickley, Coles, & Jarrell (1997) and Chen et al. (2008) who suggest that when the 
titles of CEO and Chairman are merged, a firm can enjoy quicker decision-making, lower 
information sharing costs, more efficient execution of business strategies, and more consistent 
leadership, contributing to the firm’s success. Second, after controlling for causality, we 
found a significant positive relationship between board size and financial performance. This 
result agrees with those of Hillman, Cannella, and Paetzold (2000) and Van den Berghe and 
Levrau (2004) who argue that a larger board may provide the firm with greater resource 
capacities (expertise, knowledge, and skill) and more external synergies. Additionally, we 
found a significant negative relationship between the proportion of outside board members 
and financial performance. This relationship is weak after cluster robust OLS (ordinary least 
squares) regression. However, Erickson et al. (2005) suggest that endogeneity occurs when 
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poorly performing firms are pushed by unhappy investors to add outside directors. Therefore, 
greater board independence (a larger proportion of outside directors) does not always 
translate into positive effects on a firm’s financial performance. We argue that the endogeneity 
issue may distort the relationship between the proportion of outside board directors and 
financial performance and that it leads to the weak result. To control for endogeneity, two-
stage least squares (2SLS) regression of selected instrument variables was employed. Because 
the 2SLS results did not clearly prove the negative relationship, further research may be 
required to determine the effect of outside directors on a firm’s financial performance in 
Vietnam. Apart from the main findings, we also found that chairman ownership is positively 
and linearly associated with financial performance.
This paper contributes to the current body of corporate governance literature as it 
relates to board structure in three important ways. First, this may be the initial empirical study 
examining the relationship between board structure and corporate financial performance 
among Vietnamese firms, as there are few business and management studies in this 
context. Second, given that Vietnam has an emerging and transitioning economy where 
corporate governance best practice is drawing attention from market regulators, investors, 
firm managers, and academia, our results can highlight stylized facts and implications for 
the country’s market. Third, we controlled for the endogeneity issue, something not well 
documented in previous studies, and our results differed, finding that financial performance 
exhibited a positive relationship with board size but a negative one with the proportion of 
outside board members. This supports the argument that the effectiveness of corporate 
governance mechanisms varies depending on the institutional and regulatory environment.
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews related literature and develops 
research hypotheses. Section 3 summarizes corporate governance and the institutional aspects 
applicable in Vietnam. Section 4 presents the sample collection and descriptive statistics. 
Sections 5 and 6 provide empirical results and robustness tests, respectively. Finally, Section 7 
provides our conclusions and discusses the limitations of the study.
2. Related literature and hypothesis development
The relationship between board structure and firm-level performance is an important 
corporate governance subject and has been widely documented (Berle & Means, 1932; 
Brickley et al., 1997; Erickson et al., 2005; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; McConnell & Servaes, 
1990; Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988, among others). Corporate governance reforms such 
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as recruiting additional outside directors have been carried out to monitor and supervise 
managers as well as reduce manager-shareholder conflicts. However, the effectiveness of 
these measures varies between different economic and regulatory environments (Vafeas & 
Theodorou, 1998). How firm-level performance in different contexts is affected by certain 
features of board structure, such as dual leadership, board size, and proportion of outside 
board directors, is still a hotly debated research question.
2.1 Dual leadership
It may be said that the splitting or combining of the titles of Chairman and CEO is 
a hotly debated topic among US firms. Previous studies disagree as to whether the dual 
leadership structure is advantageous and disadvantageous. Brickley et al. (1997) and Chen 
et al. (2008) suggest that quicker decision-making, lower information sharing costs, more 
efficient execution of business strategies, and consistent leadership are the potential benefits 
of dual leadership. Furthermore, the firm does not have to bear the cost of two compensation 
packages (Vafeas & Theodorou, 1998). Meanwhile, higher agency costs incurred by a lesser 
ability to monitor management (Fama & Jensen, 1983) and higher probability of abuse of 
power by the key leader are potential disadvantages of the dual regime. Additionally, dual 
leadership may lead to a lack of specialized knowledge and expertise (Vafeas & Theodorou, 
1998). Empirical evidence from previous studies yields mixed results regarding the 
relationship between dual leadership and firm performance. Jackling and Johl (2009) conclude 
that there is no significant relationship between dual leadership and firm performance among 
Indian firms. However, Brickley et al. (1997) suggest that the costs of title separation are 
larger than the benefits for most large firms in the US, supporting the argument that dual 
leadership is good for the firm. Similarly, Dehaene, Vuyst, and Ooghe (2001) conclude that 
firm ROA is significantly higher among Belgian firms when the functions are merged. On the 
other hand, Rechner and Dalton (1991) show that firms implementing the combined titles 
demonstrate lower performance among firms in the UK. It can thus be said that in different 
institutional environments, it may be difficult to conclude whether separating or merging 
the two titles relates with higher firm performance and value. Based on the relatively larger 
number of previous studies that suggest positive effects of dual leadership, we hypothesize the 
relationship between dual leadership and firm performance as follows:
Hypothesis 1: Dual leadership is positively associated with firm performance.
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2.2 Board size
Empirical studies on the topic of corporate governance have been designed to determine 
the optimal board size for a firm. Results seem to vary depending on the subject country. For 
instance, Jackling and Johl (2009) provide evidence that board size is positively associated 
with firm performance among Indian firms, an emerging country. In support of this idea, Van 
den Berghe and Levrau (2004) argue that a larger number of board members may provide 
the firm with greater resources such as expertise, knowledge, and skills. Similarly, Hillman 
et al. (2000) argue that there is a link between boards of directors with external environments 
(for instance, business networking, political connections etc…) that can become important 
resources to the firm.
There are a larger number of studies, particularly ones that focus on American and 
European firms, supporting the idea that there are negative effects of a larger board size. For 
example, Yermack (1996) suggests that there is an inverse relationship between board size 
and firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q, as well as financial performance as measured by 
ROA and Return on Sales in large US firms. When it comes to European firms, Conyon and 
Peck (1998) suggest a negative relationship between board size and ROE. Consistent with 
these findings, the more recent studies of O’Connell and Cramer (2010) suggest a significant 
negative relationship between the number of board members and firm performance as 
measured by ROA and Tobin’s Q among Irish firms. Interpreting their results, the authors 
relied on the argument of Jensen (1983) that the costs of a larger board size, such as poorer 
communication and less efficient decision-making, exceed the benefits, thus negatively 
impacting the firm. Given that (a) our study uses data from Vietnamese firms, in an emerging 
country with different institutional aspects (crony capitalism and political bribery)(1) compared 
to those of Western countries and (b) board size and performance are linked with various 
factors (the causality effect and unobservable determinants), we hypothesize the relationship 
between board size and performance as follows:
Hypothesis 2: Board size is positively associated with firm performance.
2.3 Outside board members
The roles of outside directors as a corporate governance mechanism to protect 
shareholder interests have long been debated (Erickson et al., 2005). The prominent role 
(1) See article: “Vietnam must ditch state-sponsored crony capitalist” by David Pilling published in Financial 
Times, on May 25th, 2013.
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of outside directors in the making of better decisions by the board is increasingly being 
recognized. Many countries have set minimum standards for outside director representation 
on the boards of listed firms (Dahya & McConnell, 2005). In addition to better decision-
making, outside board members are linked to monitoring effectiveness because they represent 
the interests of stakeholders who are not involved in management. Supporting this view, Fama 
(1980) suggests that outside directors may compete in the labor market, which encourages 
them to have more effective monitoring roles than top managers. Their monitoring 
effectiveness is the key determinant for their reputation. However, empirical evidence of the 
roles of outside directors varies. For instance, Dahya and McConnell, who studied firms in 
the UK, suggest that the market has a positive view of the appointment of outside directors, 
and that boards with larger percentages of outside directors are linked to better decisions. 
Krivogorsky (2006) and O’Connell and Cramer (2010) agree, and show a positive relationship 
between firm performance and the percentage of non-executive directors on the board(2) 
among firms in Europe and Ireland, respectively. Furthermore, Dehaene et al. (2001) provide 
evidence that there is a positive relationship between the number of external directors and 
ROE in Belgian firms.
In contrast, there is empirical evidence showing a negative correlation between the 
proportion of outside directors and firm performance. For example, Jackling and Johl (2009) 
indicate that having outside directors does not always accompany good firm performance. 
Outside directors with multiple appointments appear to have an inverse impact on firm 
performance. In support of this, Erickson et al. (2005) reveal the issue of endogeneity 
when “poorly performing firms are pushed by unhappy investors to add outside directors”. 
Therefore, greater board independence (a larger proportion of outside directors) does not 
always translate into positive effects on firm value. Given the fact that the proportion of 
outside directors on the board remains relatively small and there is high ownership (Viet, 
2013) concentration in Vietnam’s listed firms, we presume that the monitoring effectiveness of 
outside directors is limited. In addition, the endogeneity issue may also affect the relationship 
between the proportion of outside members and performance. We thus hypothesize the 
relationship between the proportion of outside directors and firm performance as follows:
(2) According to O’Connell and Cramer (2010), the term “outside” directors can be used interchangeably 
with “independent non-executive” or “non-executive” directors. Additionally, Dehaene et al. (2001) use 
term “external” directors instead of “outside” directors. We provide a definition of outside directors in 
Section 4.2.
“Board structure and corporate financial performance: empirical evidence from Vietnam’s listed firms”
— 211 —
Hypothesis 3: The proportion of outside directors is negatively associated with firm 
performance.
3. Background of corporate governance among Vietnam’s listed firms
In 1986, Vietnam’s economy began to shift from a centrally-planned mechanism to a 
market-oriented one, known as “Doi Moi.” The Central Communist Party and its government, 
in the 6th National Congress, affirmed its commitment to develop Vietnam’s economy 
in multiple sectors (including state, private, foreign direct investment, individuals, and 
household business sectors). The Vietnamese securities market was officially inaugurated 
after establishment of the Ho Chi Minh Securities Trading Center (HOSTC) in 2000 and then 
the Hanoi Securities Trading Center (HNX) in 2005. From 2003 to 2013, market capitalization 
was less than 20% of GDP, among the lowest in Asia. However, Vietnam’s equity market is 
seen as one of the fastest growing investment destinations, supported partly by government 
privatization programs. As a result, at the end of 2011, there were nearly 800 companies listed 
in the two stock exchanges with a market capitalization of approximately 40% of GDP.
Hai and Nunoi (2008) summarize corporate governance in Vietnam as one regulated 
by the Enterprise Law enacted in 2006, a combination of French Company Law and Anglo-
American Law. According to Enterprise Law, the mandatory internal governance structure of a 
publicly traded company includes four major components, namely, (a) shareholder’s meetings, 
(b) a board of directors, (c) a CEO, and (d) a board of supervisors. Shareholder’s meetings are 
attended by the most important decision-making body of a public company. A resolution made 
at the shareholder’s meeting must be approved by at least 65% or 75% of the total voting shares 
of attending shareholders. Enterprise Law also stipulates that the board of directors will be 
selected at a shareholder’s meeting and will consist of three to eleven members. The principle 
function of the board of directors is to manage the firm and supervise the performance of 
executive directors. Hai and Nunoi describe the board of supervisors as monitors of the board 
of directors, attending all their meetings but having no voting rights. However, the effect of 
the board of supervisors is still a long-debated topic in Vietnam because their role is depicted 
as relatively weak in some governance scandals in the country(3). Furthermore, unlike many 
other countries where minimum standards for outside director representation on the boards 
of listed firms are regulated (Dahya & McConnell, 2005), there is no clear evidence of the 
(3) The cases of Vinashin Corporation, Vinaline Corporation, and ACB Commercial Bank are well-known 
examples of weak corporate governance and insufficient board roles in Vietnam.
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role and effect of independent outside directors in Vietnam, regardless of whether they are 
playing effective monitoring roles. Finally, according to Viet (2013), the ownership structure of 
Vietnam’s listed firms is relatively concentrated. Generally, there is a controlling shareholder 
(the state and the founding family) who has significant voting power and influences all firm 
decisions. Thus, there is concern over the corporate governance of listed firms because they 
may lack effective monitoring by the second largest (or minority) shareholders. Therefore, 
board structure reform and corporate governance best practice are necessary for Vietnam’s 
firms to meet international standards.
4. Sample and definition
4.1 Sample collection(4)
We compiled financial performance ratios of listed firms from Vietnam’s two stock 
exchanges (HOSTC and HNX) from OSIRIS. From this source, we collected year-end financial 
accounting indicators including the Current Ratio, Sales, Assets, ROA, and ROE. The type 
of industry, based on the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS), was also obtained 
from OSIRIS. Value of Assets (VND billion) was measured as a real value (non-tax). We then 
obtained year-end issues (31/12) of the Daily Securities Exchange Bulletins issued by each 
exchange to retrieve foreign ownership and government ownership data, as well as data on 
stock price and the number of outstanding shares for the listed firms. Stock price and the 
number of outstanding shares were used to calculate market capitalization. Last, governance 
information for listed firms such as year listed, firm age, and listing locations, were derived 
from the company profile on the websites of GBIC Company and BIDV Securities Company 
(BSC).
Our most important information included board size, proportion of outside board 
members, and the existence of a CEO and Chairman dual regime. In order to obtain these, we 
relied on the listed firm’s annual reports. First, we collected the number of board members 
and used it as a proxy for board size. Then, we counted the number of members who were 
independent and non-executive (or not involved in management). The proportion of outside 
directors was calculated by dividing the number of outside directors by the total number 
of members. We further checked if the firm’s CEO and Chairman was the same person to 
(4) Thanks to the kind permission of Professor Katsuyuki Kubo, board structure data of this sample is 
partly derived from the database under a research project of Professor Katsuyuki Kubo’s seminar, titled 
“Political connection, behavior and firm-level performance: empirical evidence from Vietnam”.
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identify dual leadership. It is important to note that some board information was lacking in the 
annual reports of some listed firms, leading to missing data in our sample. We also collected 
information on chairman ownership, relying on the ownership disclosure of the chairman in 
the annual reports(5). Finally, our sample consisted of the nonfinancial listed firms, totaling 
1425 firm-year observations between 2006 -2010.
Table 1: Definition of Variables
Variables Definition
Financial performance
ROA (%) Return on Assets; the ratio of net income to total book value of assets.
ROE (%) Return on Equity; the ratio of net income to total equity.
Tobin’s Q A proxy for firm value reflecting growth opportunities; the ratio of market 
capitalization to book value of total assets.
Board structure
Dual_leadership Dummy variable ranging from 0 (the titles of CEO and Chairman are not merged) to 
1 (titles are merged)
All_board Number of all board members, including inside and outside members.
Out_board Number of independent outside directors.
Out/All_board Proportion of outside directors on the board; the ratio of outside members to all 
board members.
Ownership
Chairman_own (%) A proxy for board ownership; the percentage of shares held by the firm chairman.
Foreign_own (%) Collective ownership by all foreign investors.
Government_own (%) Ownership by the government.
Other firm characteristics
Asset (VND billion) Book value of total assets.
Current_ratio (%) A proxy for firm liquidity; the ratio of current liabilities to current assets.
Firm_age (years) Years since the firm incorporated.
Years_listing (years) Years since the firm was listed.
Stockex Dummy variable ranging from 0 (listed on the Hanoi Stock Exchange) to 1 (listed on 
the Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange).
Audit_big4 Dummy variable ranging from 0 (the firm auditor is not one of the Big 4 international 
auditing firms) to 1 (the auditor is either PwC, Delloitte, Ernst & Young, or KPMG).
(5) Therefore, if the chairman hides his/her real ownership by transferring his/her ownership to the 
third independent asset management companies, or if the chairman transfers the ownership to his/her 
relatives for different purposes, we are not able to have full ownership information. However, we argue 
that the ownership by the chairman published on firm annual reports is an important indication that 
reflects how the chairman as a shareholder shares the same interests with other owners of the firm.
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4.2 Definitions of important terms
We employed three indicators as proxies for firm financial performance. We used ROA, 
the ratio of net income to total assets, and ROE, the ratio of net income to total equity as 
two performance ratios that reflect current financial performance. Furthermore, using the 
techniques of Oxelheim and Randoy (2003), Viet (2013), and Villalonga and Amit (2006), we 
used Tobin’s Q to reflect growth opportunities or future prospects of the firm as an additional 
performance measure. Tobin’s Q is considered a measure of market-based performance and is 
calculated as the ratio of market capitalization to book value of total assets. It has been widely 
used in the empirical studies of Chung and Pruitt (1994), Ferris and Park (2005), McConnell 
and Servaes (1990), O’Connell and Cramer (2010).
It is important to note that there are different definitions of the term outside director. 
According to O’Connell and Cramer (2010), the term can be interchangeable with independent 
non-executive director or non-executive director. Dehaene et al. (2001) favor the term external 
director. We use the term outside director and define it as a non-executive board member 
who is independent from the firm’s daily operations and does not participate in management 
activities. The outside director is expected to play (a) a monitoring role for behaviors and 
responsibilities of the board, or (b) an advisory role for business strategies or operations of the 
firm.
4.3 Descriptive statistics
Table 2 indicates that the average ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q for our sample was 7.65%, 
16.24% and 0.87, respectively. The standard deviations for ROA and ROE (7.29 and 13.12, 
respectively) were relatively large, reflecting high variations in financial performance in 
the sample. Hai and Nunoi (2008) state that under Enterprise Law, the board of directors 
will consist of three to eleven board members. Our data show that all boards meet this 
requirement. The average board size is 5.57, much smaller than the average board size in 
the UK (8.50) (Dahya & McConnell, 2005) or Canada (10.68) (Erickson et al., 2005). In our 
sample, the average number of outside directors and the average percentage of outside 
directors are 0.93 and 16%, respectively. The median number of outside board members is 0, 
indicating that at least 50% of the listed firms do not have outside directors(6). 
Unlike boards of directors in other countries, the number of outside members and the 
proportion of outside members in Vietnam are relatively small. These values are 4.00 and 50% 
(6) It is also noticeable that more than 80% of listed firms in the sample have a board size of 5 members.
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among UK firms (Dahya & McConnell, 2005), and 4.62 and 48% among Indian firms (Jackling 
& Johl, 2009). The lower values among Vietnamese firms may be due to a relatively smaller 
firm size (average asset value ≈ US$ 50 million) compared with the international norm, making 
it unreasonable to maintain a large board size. Moreover, the high ownership concentration (a 
controlling number of shares held by the state or the founding family) may prevent minority 
shareholders from nominating more board members or outside directors (Hai & Nunoi, 
2008). Furthermore, the average chairman’s ownership of 10% allows a significant influence 
on the firm. Lastly, 41% of the firms use dual leadership. This is higher than that in India (35%) 
(Jackling & Johl, 2009) but lower than that in the UK (66%) (Vafeas & Theodorou, 1998).
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of the Sample
Variables N Min Mean Median Max SD
ROA (%) 1,425 -34.43 7.65 6.26 54.84 7.29 
ROE (%) 1,425 -64.03 16.24 15.11 81.29 13.12 
Tobin’s Q 1,414 0.05 0.87 0.56 12.82 1.07 
All_board 1,280 3.00 5.57 5.00 11.00 1.19 
Out_board 1,016 0.00 0.93 0.00 7.00 1.44 
Out/All_board 1,012 0.00 0.16 0.00 1.00 0.25 
Chairman_own (%) 895 0.00 0.10 0.01 20.41 0.70 
Dual_leadership 1,302 0.00 0.41 0.00 1.00 0.49 
Foreign_own (%) 1,418 0.00 8.18 2.12 49.00 12.27 
Government_own (%) 1,420 0.00 29.56 30.00 87.70 23.91 
Asset (VND billion) 1,425 7.50 980.8 352.8 31686.9 2338.7 
Current_ratio (%) 1,425 0.09 2.08 1.46 25.88 2.06 
Firm_age (years) 1,418 0.00 19.59 16.00 56.00 13.16 
Years_listing (years) 1,420 0.00 2.88 3.00 10.00 2.00 
Audit_big4 1,425 0.00 0.06 0.00 1.00 0.23 
Note. Asset, Firm_age and Years_listing will be in the natural logarithm form for regression.
4.4 Univariate tests
We compared firms that employed dual leadership with firms those that did not and 
found that the former performed better in terms of ROA and ROE. Results are shown in Panel 
A of Table 3. We also compared firms based on board size. We divided the sample into two 
groups: those that had a board size larger than or equal to the sample’s median (5 members), 
and those that had a board size smaller than the sample’s median. It is important to note that 
around 80% of our sample had a board size equal to the median. Panel B shows that the group 
with a large board size performed better in terms of ROA and ROE, using t-tests). We divided 
the sample according to their use of outside directors. Panel C shows that firms with outside 
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directors perform better than those without outside directors (but only in terms of ROA). 
Finally, we identified firms that experienced an increase in the number of outside directors 
and compared their performance at the year of this change to the prior year’s performance. 
Panel D shows that performance, in terms of Tobin’s Q, was lower one year before the change. 
This result is consistent with the argument that poor-performing firms may recruit more 
outside directors to improve monitoring effectiveness.
Table 3: Univariate Tests Comparing Performance of Different Firm Groups
Panel A: Effect of Dual Leadership
Non-dual leadership Dual leadership Non-Dual vs. Dual
N Mean p50 N Mean p50 t-tests Rank-sum tests
ROA (%) 762 7.20 6.02 539 8.35 6.86 -2.74*** -2.87***
ROE (%) 762 15.87 14.60 539 17.07 16.05 -1.60* -1.73*
Tobin's Q 757 0.86 0.55 534 0.91 0.58 -0.79 -1.16
Panel B: Effect of Board Size
Large board Small board Small vs. Large
N Mean p50 N Mean p50 t-tests Rank-sum tests
ROA (%) 1246 7.79 6.29 33 5.48 5.12 -1.78** -1.55
ROE (%) 1246 16.53 15.40 33 13.52 14.33 -1.30** -0.94
Tobin's Q 1237 0.85 0.56 33 0.80 0.49 -0.28  0.15
Panel C: Effect of Outside Directors
Without outside directors With outside directors Without vs. With
N Mean p50 N Mean p50 t-tests Rank-sum tests
ROA (%) 614 7.18 5.77 398 7.76 6.50 -1.31* -2.03**
ROE (%) 614 16.6 16.03 398 16.00 14.53 0.74 0.96
Tobin's Q 608 0.87 0.52 396 0.80 0.55 1.10 -1.15
Panel D: Effect of Addition of Outside Directors
Year (t-1) Year (t) Year (t-1) vs. Year (t)
N Mean p50 N Mean p50 t-tests Rank-sum tests
ROA (%) 32 8.54 6.86 33 8.09 7.10 0.19 0.41
ROE (%) 32 17.39 16.45 33 14.33 13.34 0.87 1.05
Tobin's Q 31 1.38 1.13 33 0.68 0.62 2.77*** 2.67***
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01.
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5. Estimation results
We used OLS regressions clustered at the firm level to examine the relationship between 
board structure and firm financial performance. The robust cluster regressions are expected 
to address problems of heteroskedasticity within firms in the estimations. In the regressions, 
each board feature was tested separately in the three specifications. Specification 1 examined 
the relationship between firm performance and dual leadership. Likewise, Specifications 2 and 
3 examined the relationship between firm performance and board size and outside directors, 
respectively. 
The estimation models are as follows:
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where Performance jt is the dependent variable representing financial performance (ROA, ROE, 
or Tobin’s Q) of firm j in year t, α is an intercept, and εjt is the error term. “m” and “k” are the 
number of industry and year, respectively. β!  in each specification is a coefficient of the 
relationship between each of the three features of the board structure and firm performance. The sign 
of this coefficient was then used to test the research hypotheses. Panels A, B, and C of Table 4 show 
the results of the relationship tests. 
 
Panel A of Table 4 shows a positive relationship between dual leadership and firm financial 
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regime are therefore determinant factors for the success of the firms. While Fama and Jensen 
(1983) suggest that there are higher agency costs and a higher probability of abuse of power, 
and Dehaene et al. (2001) and Vafeas and Theodorou (1998) contend that dual leadership may 
lead to a lack of specialized knowledge, we have shown, that in this instance, dual leadership 
is beneficial. There are some reported corporate governance scandals in Vietnam, but their 
detrimental effects are not evident in our sample. The positive impact of dual leadership 
presented a relatively surprising result in our Vietnamese context. Our results may support 
the view that leadership concentration is not necessarily a governance issue in an emerging 
economy such as that in Vietnam. Additionally, it can be said that the value of dual leadership 
depends on the institutional environment.
Panel B of Table 4 shows a positive correlation between board size and firm financial 
performance as measured by ROA at the 5% level in model (1). The relationship between 
either ROE or Tobin’s Q and firm performance is not significant. This result is consistent 
with the findings of Jackling and Johl (2009) and Van den Berghe and Levrau (2004), who 
support the argument that a large board may provide the firm with greater resources and that 
having more directors on the board can become important to the firm (Hillman et al., 2000). 
We recognize that a causality problem may occur when examining the relationship between 
board size and performance. Because good-performing firms may attract investments (both 
domestic and foreign) by outside investors, new shareholders may nominate additions to the 
current board to improve monitoring effectiveness in alignment with their interests. Causality 
may lead to the relationship that we found, so we thus employed other estimation methods to 
further examine the relationship between board size and firm financial performance. These 
will be discussed in the latter part of this paper(7).
(7) From Table 4, we also obtain the result that firm age exhibits a positive relationship with firm financial 
performance. The result may support the hypothesis that older firms have more business experience 
that contributes to the firm success. It seems to be consistent with the country context that older firms 
may have stronger connections with local authority, hold better property location and enjoy safer land 
security, compared to the younger firms. The advantages may lead to better performance in older firms. 
In addition to this, we also find that years listed exhibits a negative relationship with firm performance. 
This result can be interpreted as firms listed more recently may have lower profiles than those listed in 
previous years because of more relaxed listing requirements applied in the stock exchanges after the 
world financial crisis (late 2008).
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Table 4: OLS Examining the Relationship between Board Structure and Firm Performance
Panel A: Dual Leadership vs. Firm Performance
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
ROA ROE Tobin's Q
Dual_leadership 1.438** (0.708) 2.426* (1.236) 0.125 (0.078)
Chairman_own (%) 2.421 (1.827) 2.664 (3.107) 0.182 (0.278)
Government_own (%) 0.0623*** (0.017) 0.100*** (0.023) 0.001 (0.002)
Foreign_own (%) 0.143*** (0.038) 0.119* (0.064) 0.015*** (0.005)
Asset (log) -1.052*** (0.305) 1.008* (0.557) -0.038 (0.048)
Current_ratio (%) 0.577*** (0.190) -0.154 (0.200) 0.080*** (0.023)
Firm_age (log) 1.201*** (0.459) 2.280*** (0.851) 0.007 (0.056)
Stockex 1.624** (0.785) -2.793* (1.512) 0.215* (0.127)
Years_listing (log) -1.754** (0.688) -2.775** (1.133) -0.257*** (0.081)
Audit_big4 2.936 (1.809) 3.615 (3.026) 0.319* (0.184)
Industry and year dummy Yes Yes Yes
Intercept 20.06*** (6.392) -12.870 (11.410) 1.023 (0.971)
Observations 738 738 731             
R-sq 0.183 0.117 0.279             
Adjusted R-sq 0.166 0.099 0.264             
Note. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01.
Panel B: Board Size vs. Firm Performance
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
ROA ROE Tobin's Q
All_board 0.596** (0.298) 0.594 (0.486) 0.067 (0.054)
Chairman_own (%) 3.031 (1.896) 3.624 (3.228) 0.243 (0.290)
Government_own (%) 0.0662*** (0.017) 0.102*** (0.031) 0.001 (0.002)
Foreign_own (%) 0.130*** (0.040) 0.112* (0.066) 0.013*** (0.005)
Asset (log) -1.241*** (0.320) 0.749 (0.567) -0.059 (0.047)
Current_ratio (%) 0.531*** (0.186) -0.227 (0.197) 0.076*** (0.023)
Firm_age (log) 1.215*** (0.466) 2.289*** (0.863) 0.008 (0.057)
Stockex 1.727** (0.818) -2.769* (1.546) 0.237* (0.130)
Years_listing (log) -1.982*** (0.676) -3.131*** (1.136) -0.288*** (0.084)
Audit_big4 3.115 (1.915) 3.930 (3.151) 0.346* (0.191)
Industry and year dummy Yes Yes Yes
Intercept 21.31*** -6.241 -9.563 -11.43 1.129 -1.008
Observations 731 731 724             
R-sq 0.179 0.112 0.282             
Adjusted R-sq 0.162 0.094 0.267             
Note. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01.
“Board structure and corporate financial performance: empirical evidence from Vietnam’s listed firms”
— 220 —
Panel C: Outside Director vs. Firm Performance
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
ROA ROE Tobin's Q
Out/All_board -0.709 (1.841) -2.402 (3.236) -0.286* (0.167)
Chairman_own (%) 7.501** (3.126) 10.30* (5.716) 0.798 (0.486)
Government_own (%) 0.0625*** (0.019) 0.104*** (0.034) 0.000 (0.003)
Foreign_own (%) 0.138*** (0.045) 0.127* (0.075) 0.013*** (0.005)
Asset (log) -1.167*** (0.322) 0.958 (0.594) -0.057 (0.057)
Current_ratio (%) 0.425** (0.167) -0.260 (0.189) 0.070*** (0.021)
Firm_age (log) 1.224** (0.476) 1.899** (0.892) 0.026 (0.063)
Stockex 1.231 (0.867) -3.255** (1.626) 0.202 (0.142)
Years_listing (log) -2.403*** (0.724) -4.184*** (1.167) -0.293*** (0.088)
Audit_big4 3.790* -2.173 4.763 -3.466 0.366* -0.218
Industry and year dummy Yes Yes Yes
Intercept 23.90*** -6.747 -8.313 -12.29 1.507 -1.135
Observations 614 614 608             
R-sq 0.179 0.129 0.278             
Adjusted R-sq 0.159 0.107 0.259             
Note. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01.
Panel C of Table 4 reveals that that there is a negative association between the 
proportion of outside board members and firm financial performance as measured by Tobin’s 
Q. This result is significant at the 10% level in model (3). In other words, firms with higher 
board independence exhibited poorer firm performance. The relationship is not significant 
between financial performance and ROA or ROE. In addition, it is not in line with the 
findings of Dehaene et al. (2001); Krivogorsky (2006); or O’Connell and Cramer (2010). It is 
consistent, though, with those of Jackling and Johl (2009) who showed that the proportion 
of outside directors does not always correlate with good firm performance and that outside 
directors with multiple appointments appear to have an inverse impact on firm performance. 
Additionally, our result supports the argument of Erickson et al. (2005) who believed that 
when firms experience a business downturn, they are pushed by concerned investors to add 
outside directors. A larger number of outside directors thus do not always translate to better 
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firm performance(8). We argue that appointment of outside directors may be an outcome 
of endogenous decisions. The issue may distort the relationship between the proportion of 
outside board members and firm financial performance. Later part of this study will employ 
other estimation methods to address this issue.
6. Robustness checks
There are concerns of a causality relationship between board size or proposition of 
outside directors and firm performance. The causality problem may distort the signs of the 
coefficients in the regressions, and this can lead to a misunderstanding of the relationship 
between board structure and firm performance. We employed other estimation methods and 
model specifications to mitigate the issue and check the robustness of our research results.
6.1 Causality effect: board size and firm financial performance
We used 2SLS regression to control for the causality problem in the relationship 
between board size and firm financial performance. We relied on the argument that the 
recruitment of board members may depend on the performance results from previous 
years. In addition, foreign investors may begin to play more important roles in the corporate 
governance mechanism in Vietnam’s market. The presence of minority foreign shareholders 
may be connected with better monitoring effects (Viet, 2013). We thus selected a one-year 
lag between firm financial performance and the collective ownership of foreign shareholders 
as the two instrument variables. Meanwhile, the board size is the endogenous variable of the 
2SLS regression. Firm financial performance is measured by ROA, ROE, and or Tobin’s Q. 
Since three features of board structure (dual leadership, board size and percentage of outside 
board members) were all included in the multivariate regression analysis in the previous 
studies, in this section, we thus test these features simultaneously using 2SLS estimation as 
the robustness check for the earlier results. 
(8) There may be concern that poor-performing firms may appoint outside directors to enhance monitoring 
and gain advisory benefits. After a certain time since the appointment, the firms’ performance may 
naturally move back toward their average (mean) level due to the “mean reversion” effects rather 
than the impacts of new outside directors. As our result shows negative outside director-performance 
relationship, the “mean reversion” issue can be ignored.  
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The 2SLS regression models are as follows:
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Tobin’s Q. Moreover, we found the results of Hausman tests (in terms of ROA and Tobin’s Q) of the 
2SLS to be significant. This leads us to conclude that board size is the endogenous variable, 
suggesting that the instrument variables were valid. This result is consistent with those of our cluster 
regression, indicating that board size exhibits a positive association with firm performance. 
Furthermore, Table 5 shows other results that align with those of earlier regressions, supporting two 
of our research hypotheses. Hypothesis 1, that dual leadership is positively associated with firm 
financial performance, was proven only in terms of ROE. Hypothesis 3, that the proportion of outside 
members is negatively associated with firm performance, was proven in terms of ROA and Tobin’s Q. 
Table 5 also provides evidence that chairman ownership is positively associated with financial 
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Table 5: 2SLS Regression for the Relationship between Board Size and Firm Performance
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
ROA ROE Tobin's Q
All_board 6.921*** 3.028 0.344** 
(2.126) (2.408) (0.139)
Dual_leadership 1.232 2.467* 0.068 
(1.099) (1.399) (0.065)
Out/All_board -4.814* -4.944 -0.294** 
(2.548) (3.838) (0.143)
Chairman_own (%) 9.746** 11.76* 0.914***
(4.625) (6.462) (0.320)
Government_own (%) 0.149*** 0.149*** 0.00691***
(0.035) (0.050) (0.002)
Asset (log) -2.035*** 1.106 -0.131***
(0.538) (0.739) (0.036)
Current_ratio (%) 0.345 -0.114 0.0468***
(0.227) (0.265) (0.016)
Firm_age (log) 1.363** 1.832* 0.0836*  
(0.651) (0.964) (0.044)
Stockex 1.490 -4.515*** 0.271***
(1.231) (1.645) (0.085)
Years_listing (log) -2.319** -2.682** -0.139** 
(1.059) (1.300) (0.068)
Audit_big4 3.549 6.614 0.419*  
(3.152) (4.135) (0.215)
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes
Intercept 0.841 -30.57** 0.701 
(10.400) (14.460) (0.752)
Observations 377 377 374
Wald Chi 2 (15) 44.03*** 58.75*** 108.00***
Tests of endogeneity
Robust score Chi2 (1) 21.76*** 1.73 13.00***
Robust F (1,354) 20.92*** 1.55 12.79***
Note. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01.
6.2 Endogeneity: outside directors and firm financial performance
We again employed 2SLS regressions to control for endogeneity when exploring the 
relationship between outside board members and financial performance. We relied on the 
three potential determinants of the proportion of outside director. First, we based on the 
argument presented by Erickson et al., (2005) that firms may be under pressure to recruit 
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outside board members by disappointed shareholders who want to improve monitoring 
effectiveness or have additional resources. Second, we argue that foreign investors play 
an important role in nominating outside board members because they may want to have a 
representative of their choosing on the board to monitor executives, supervise the board’s 
behaviors, or to provide business strategic advisories for the board. Third and finally, whether 
any board member can be added may depend on current board size. It will be difficult for 
shareholders to get approval for more outside board members if the board is already large. 
Consequently, we selected three instrument variables: (a) a one-year lag value of firm financial 
performance, (b) collective ownership of foreign shareholders, and (c) a one-year lag of the 
size of the board. The board size is the endogenous variable of these 2SLS regressions which 
are as follows:
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Table 6 shows the results of the second-stage of the 2SLS regression investigating the relationship 
between outside board members and financial performance (first-stage is not reported). It shows that 
after controlling for endogeneity, there is a negative relationship between outside board members and 
firm financial performance as measured by ROE. While the result is not significant with respect to 
ROA and Tobin’s Q, it is consistent with our previous OLS regression, which indicated that outside 
board members exhibit a negative association with firm performance. We also used Hausman tests to 
determine whether board size is an endogenous variable. They suggest that the instrument variables 
were valid. However, the high magnitude of the coefficient of Out/All_board should be interpreted 
with caution. It is important to note that choosing an appropriate instrument variable is not an easy 
task because of the lack of supporting theoretical evidence and sufficient data. This is a major 
problem when conducting 2SLS regressions in empirical studies (Ferris & Park, 2005). Therefore, 
further research on the effects of outside directors may be required. Furthermore, in Table 6, we also 
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Consequently, we selected three instrument variable : (a) a one-ye r lag v lue of fi m financial
performance, (b) collective ownership of foreign shareholders, and (c) a one-year lag of the size of the 
board. The board size is the endogenous variable of these 2SLS regressions which are as follows: 
 
Out/All_boardjt=  α  + β!Performance jt-1 + β!Foreign ownership jt + β!All_boardjt-1 
       +    β!Dual_Leadership jt + !jt + εjt. (First-Stage Regression) 
 
Performancejt=  α  + β!Predicted_Out/All_board jt + β!Dual_Leadership jt 
+ !jt + εjt. (Second-Stage Regression) 
 
where Out/All_board jtis the endogenous variable, Performance jt-1 is the first instrument variable, 
a one-year lag of financial performance (ROA, ROE, or Tobin’s Q) of firm j in year t, 
Foreign ownership jt  is the second instrument variable,, All_boardjt-1 is the third instrument variable, 
the board size of the previous year, α  is an intercept, !jt    reflects other firm’s characteristics, 
Dual_leadership jt    is a dummy variable, and εjt is the error term. 
 
Table 6 shows the results of the second-stage of the 2SLS regression investigating the relationship 
between outside board members and financial performance (first-stage is not reported). It shows that 
after controlling for endogeneity, there is a negative relationship between outside board members and 
firm financial performance as measured by ROE. While the result is not significant with respect to 
ROA and Tobin’s Q, it is consistent with our previous OLS regression, which indicated that outside 
board members exhibit a negative association with firm performance. We also used Hausman tests to 
determine whether board size is an endogenous variable. They suggest that the instrument variables 
were valid. However, the high magnitude of the coefficient of Out/All_board should be interpreted 
with caution. It is important to note that choosing an appropriate instrument variable is not an easy 
task because of the lack of supporting theoretical evidence and sufficient data. This is a major 
problem when conducting 2SLS regressions in empirical studies (Ferris & Park, 2005). Therefore, 
further research on the effects of outside directors may be required. Furthermore, in Table 6, we also 
where Out/All_board jt is the endogenous variable, Performance jt-1 is the first instrument 
variable, a one-year lag of financial performance (ROA, ROE, or Tobin’s Q) of firm j in year 
t, Foreign ownership jt is the second instrument variable, All_board jt-1 is the third instrument 
variable, the board size of the previous year, α  is an intercept, δ jt reflects other firm’s 
characteristics, Dual_leadershipjt is a dummy variable, and ε jt is the error term.
Table 6 shows the results of the second-stage of the 2SLS regression investigating the 
relationship between outside board members and financial performance (first-stage is not 
reported). It shows that af er controlli g for endogene ty, there is a n gative relationship
betwee  outside board memb r  and firm financial performance as measured by ROE. While
the result is not significant with respect to ROA and Tobin’s Q, it is consistent with our 
previous OLS regression, which indicated that outside board members exhibit a negative 
association with firm performance. We also used Hausman tests to determine whether 
board size is an endogenous variable. They suggest that the instrument variables were valid. 
However, the high magnitude of the coefficient of Out/All_board should be interpreted with 
caution. It is important to note that choosing an appropriate instrument variable is not an 
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easy task because of the lack of supporting theoretical evidence and sufficient data. This is a 
major problem when conducting 2SLS regressions in empirical studies (Ferris & Park, 2005). 
Therefore, further research on the effects of outside directors may be required. Furthermore, 
in Table 6, we also find results consistent with our research hypothesis, that dual leadership is 
positively associated with financial performance, but this is proven only with respect to ROA.
Table 6: 2SLS Regression for the Relationship between Outside Directors and Firm Performance
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
ROA ROE Tobin's Q
Out/All_board 9.472 -51.44** -0.699 
(15.830) (25.760) (0.910)
Dual_leadership 2.097** 2.055 0.090 
(0.892) (1.951) (0.056)
Chairman_own (%) 7.047** 16.06* 0.826***
(3.424) (9.560) (0.318)
Government_own (%) 0.0620*** 0.079 0.001 
(0.024) (0.055) (0.001)
Asset (log) -0.464 0.606 -0.0791** 
(0.514) (1.052) (0.039)
Current_ratio (%) 0.499** -0.063 0.0552***
(0.240) (0.360) (0.017)
Firm_age (log) 1.657*** 2.282* 0.105***
(0.581) (1.338) (0.041)
Stockex 0.067 -1.614 0.287***
(1.542) (2.979) (0.105)
Years_listing (log) -1.032 -1.436 -0.046 
(0.837) (1.988) (0.062)
Audit_big4 5.949** 8.807** 0.569***
(2.676) (3.595) (0.165)
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes
Intercept 6.038 2.136 1.624*  
(11.700) (23.560) (0.887)
Observations 351 351 349
Wald Chi 2(14) 54.23*** 48.33*** 118.01***
Tests of endogeneity
Robust score Chi2(1) 0.50 5.33** 0.45
Robust F (1, 333) 0.53 4.28** 0.40
Note. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01.
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6.3 Other additional tests
We adjusted our performance indicators for the robustness checks. They were calculated 
by subtracting firm performance from the median of the performance of all firms in the same 
industry. For instance, if the ROE of firm A, a retailer, was 15% and the median ROE for the 
retail industry was 10%; firm A’s adjusted ROA was 5% (15% minus 10%). In addition to the 
main results of the three features of board structure, the results of previous cluster robust 
OLS and 2SLS regressions also show that chairman ownership was positively associated with 
firm financial performance as measured by all three performance ratios.(9)(10) However, there 
is a concern that there may be a causality relationship between chairman ownership and firm 
financial performance. The chairman with insider information can better predict the firm’s 
future profitability, growth, and perspective. Therefore, the chairman may increase ownership 
when firm financial performance is expected to be good. With the significant large ownership, 
the chairman might have voting decision influencing the board structure features. Recognize 
the potential influence of chairman’s ownership and to control for causality, we used a one-
year lag of the values of chairman ownership as well as adjusted ratios for the OLS regression. 
The unreported results are consistent with those of prior regressions and with our hypotheses 
that dual leadership is positively associated with firm performance in terms of Tobin’s Q. They 
also show that the proportion of outside board members is negatively associated with firm 
performance in terms of Tobin’s Q and that board size is positively (but weakly) associated 
with firm performance in terms of ROA. Finally, chairman ownership was consistently and 
positively correlated with firm performance.
We also found that there may be a positive correlation between board size and firm 
size. O’Connell and Cramer (2010) suggest that the relationship between board size and firm 
performance is influenced by firm size. Therefore, firm size can be an important determinant 
(9) This result is consistent with those of previous literature (Short & Keasey, 1999; Vafeas & Theodorou, 
1998) which suggests that when board members are also firm shareholders, they may share similar 
interests such as firm value maximization purposes with other shareholders. As a result, they are 
thought to be less likely to make decisions that are detrimental to shareholders. In addition, the 
result can be interpreted that the chairman with firm shares has a financial incentive to improve 
firm profitability by better supervising the operation of executives and enhancing decision-making 
effectiveness of the board.
(10) In our sample, 41% of the firms have the dual regime. Therefore, the chairman ownership in our sample, 
to some extent, reflects the CEO ownership or managerial ownership. We also tested the non-monotonic 
board ownership-performance relationship, but no significant result was found, which suggests that the 
relationship between board ownership and firm performance exists in linear in form.
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of board size and can be used as an additional instrument variable in our 2SLS regressions. 
We duplicated the 2SLS regression described in Section 6.1. Firm size was defined as a third 
instrument variable. The endogenous variable remained board size. Table 7 shows that, in 
agreement with prior tests, (a) board size was positively associated with financial performance, 
(b) the proportion of outside directors was negatively associated with financial performance, 
in terms of ROE only, and (c) dual leadership was positively associated with financial 
performance. Results of the Hausman tests in terms of all the ratios suggest that board size is 
indeed endogenous variable(11). In summary, even though the research results in prior tests 
and these additional tests do not show significant evidence for all three performance indicators 
at the same time, they provide consistent and sufficient evidence to confirm the direction of 
the relationship between board structure and firm-level performance.
Lastly, we also duplicated the regressions by using fixed effect and random effect 
models. There were no significant results found. In fact, we found that a large percentage 
of our sample did not experience changes in their board size or use of dual leadership 
throughout the 5-year study period. In addition, as aforementioned, there are missing data 
on the features of board structure of many firms, which makes it impossible to observe and 
assess the effects of board structure features in continuous years of our sample period. We 
thus argue that the lack of significance due to the missing data and little variation in the 
three features of board structure within any one firm. We do expect that the uses of OLS 
regressions clustered at the firm level are appropriate and control for the autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity within firms.
(11) However, Hansen tests (over-identifying tests) are not valid (similar to results of the 2SLS in Sections 
6.1 and 6.2), suggesting that weak instruments may be selected. Therefore, further research and better 
selection of instruments are required to address the issue.
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Table 7: 2SLS Regression for the Relationship between Board Size and Firm Financial 
Performance Using Additional Instrument (Firm Size)
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
ROA ROE Tobin's Q
All_board 3.434*** 4.939** 0.119 
(1.271) (2.206) (0.091)
Dual_leadership 1.841** 2.135 0.103*  
(0.860) (1.469) (0.054)
Out/All_board -2.201 -6.371* -0.128 
(2.122) (3.796) (0.109)
Chairman_own (%) 7.535** 12.970* 0.776***
(3.756) (6.721) (0.282)
Government_own (%) 0.087*** 0.183*** 0.003*  
(0.026) (0.048) (0.002)
Current_ratio (%) 0.584** (0.244) 0.0622***
(0.230) (0.250) (0.016)
Firm_age (log) 1.598*** 1.703* 0.096** 
(0.540) (1.010) (0.039)
Stockex -0.493 -3.439** 0.145** 
(0.959) (1.671) (0.061)
Years_listing (log) -1.546* -3.105** -0.086 
(0.818) (1.323) (0.054)
Audit_big4 3.282 6.752 0.402** 
(2.410) (4.419) (0.166)
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes
Intercept -20.15*** -19.240 -0.642 
(7.509) (13.150) (0.554)
Observations 377 377 374
Wald chi 2(14) 47.66*** 47.93*** 124.25***
Tests of endogeneity
Robust score chi 2(1) 7.79*** 5.53** 2.94*
Robust regression F(1,358) 8.06*** 5.19** 2.98*
Note. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01.
7. Conclusion
This study examined the relationship between board structure (dual leadership, board 
size and outside board directors) and financial performance of nonfinancial firms on Vietnam’s 
stock exchanges from 2006-2010.
We found that a positive relationship between dual leadership and firm financial 
performance, consistent with the results of Brickley et al. (1997) and Chen et al. (2008) who 
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suggest that under dual leadership, firms can enjoy quicker decision-making process, lower 
information sharing costs, more efficient execution of business strategies, and more consistent 
leadership. After controlling for causality, we found a positive relationship between board size 
and firm financial performance, consistent with the results of Hillman et al. (2000) and Van den 
Berghe and Levrau (2004) who argue that a larger board may provide the firm with greater 
resources and more combined synergies. After controlling for endogeneity, we also found that 
there is a negative relationship between the proportion of outside board members and firm 
financial performance, consistent with the results of Erickson et al. (2005) who suggest that 
poorly performing firms are pushed by concerned shareholders to increase the proportion 
of outside directors to improve monitoring effectiveness and bring more external resources 
to help them turn their performance around. Greater board independence does not always 
translate into a positive relationship with firm financial performance; however, it is vital to note 
that our results show a weak relationship. The effects of outside directors on firm performance 
need to be examined further using more sufficient data and appropriate estimation techniques. 
In addition to the main findings, we found strong evidence of a positive linear relationship 
between chairman ownership (a proxy for board ownership) and financial performance of the 
firm.
Given the fact that Vietnam has an emerging and transitioning economy where 
corporate governance best practice is drawing attention from market regulators, investors, 
firm managers, and academia, the research results here can bring more stylized facts and 
implications for the country’s markets. Some of our results are not consistent with those of 
previous studies on the relationships between financial performance and board size or outside 
board members, supporting the argument that the effectiveness of corporate governance 
mechanisms varies depending on the institutional and regulatory environment. In order to 
facilitate further research, the identity of outside board directors, expertise of each board 
member, full data of board structures, other board’s characteristics (frequency of the board 
meetings and attendance of outside board members) and insightful firm case studies of 
the board’s activities are needed. Furthermore, more advanced estimation techniques (for 
instance, Difference-in-Difference, appropriate matching methods) are also required to 
examine financial performance of the firms before and after the outside (inside) directors’ 
appointment events.
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